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Abstract
This paper discusses key findings concerning population dynamic of the Indigenous minorities 
living in the Russian North during the post-Soviet period, highlighted by the 2002 Census. 
The paper places recent demographic trends into the context of past and current economic, 
social and institutional changes. It also provides comparisons with Indigenous population 
dynamics in other parts of the Arctic. Although most Indigenous peoples of the Russian North 
were growing numerically, they still experienced effects of Russia’s economic crisis, primarily 
reflected in rapidly falling fertility and rising mortality in the middle-age cohorts. In addition, 
both the ethnic drift and legal changes seriously contributed to the population dynamic. 
Key words: Indigenous peoples, Russia, population dynamics
Résumé
Cet article discute les résultats clés concernant la dynamique des populations des minorités 
indigènes vivant dans le nord de la Russie dans l’ère post-soviétique, ainsi que soulignés 
dans le recensement de 2002. Cet article place les récentes tendances démographiques dans 
le contexte des changements économiques, sociaux, et institutionnels passés et présents. Il 
apporte aussi des comparaisons avec d’autres dynamiques de populations indigènes dans 
d’autres régions de l’Arctique. Bien que la plupart des peuples indigènes voyaient leurs nom-
bres augmenter, ils ressentaient quand même les effets de la crise économique en Russie; ceci 
se reflétait surtout dans les taux de fertilité en baisse rapide et les taux de mortalité en hausse 
dans la population d’âge mur. De plus, la migration ethnique et les changements légaux ont 
eu un impact important sur la dynamique des populations.
Mots-clés: Peuples indigènes, Russie, dynamique des populationsAndrey N. Petrov
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Introduction
In October of 2002, thirteen years after the last Soviet census, Russia held its first 
census as an independent state. Census 2002 gives a long-overdue opportunity to con-
duct a thorough assessment of population dynamics in post-Soviet Russia. Although 
the overall trend of these changes was expectedly negative due to the continuing and 
well-documented demographic crisis (Heleniak, 1995; Semenov and Petrov, 2001), 
the census provided a new insight into a wide spectrum of demographic problems, 
not the least of which is the survivability of the Indigenous ethnic groups. 
In the last century, the Indigenous peoples of the Russian North, especially 
minority groups, (or “the Indigenous numerically small peoples of the North” [IN-
SPN]), by any account, have had very troubled history and have been facing formi-
dable challenges (Pika and Prokhorov, 1988, Shnirelman, 1994; Diatchkova, 2001). 
Сollectivization, forced sedentarization, and intensive assimilation in the Soviet peri-
od followed decades of diseases and poverty in the 19th century (Poelzer and Fondahl, 
1997). Along with assimilation, the unusual problem of a demographic “stalemate” 
surfaced later in the 1970s. The Indigenous peoples experienced a halt in the pro-
cess of demographic transition: while fertility rates were slowly in decline, mortality 
failed to recede to the expected levels. The source of this pattern was also unusual. Al-
though better medical care and socioeconomic conditions predictably reduced infant 
mortality, extraordinarily high death rates in the middle-age cohorts were responsible 
for the shrinking natural growth and low life expectancy. These problems prompted 
some researchers in the 1970s to suggest that the Indigenous peoples of the Russian 
North were approaching extinction. Although this pessimistic scenario has not come 
true, the Indigenous peoples still face serious challenges preserving their populations 
and cultures (Pika and Prokhorov, 1988; Bogoyavlensky, 1994; 2004; Ziker, 2002). 
The main objective of this paper is to review and discuss the population dynamic 
and the changes in the demographic structure of Indigenous minorities (INSPN) in 
the context of cultural, economic, and social transformations experienced by differ-
ent generations of Indigenous people in the post-Soviet period. This discussion will 
also be informative for a wider debate about the demographic viability of Indigenous 
ethnic groups in the Russian North, compared to their counterparts in other Arctic 
countries. The paper draws on census and annual statistical reports, as well as on the 
existing analytical studies. Particular attention is given to the Indigenous population 
structure anomalies associated with fundamental demographic changes and an inten-
sive “ethnic drift” in the last few decades, as well as with the socioeconomic crisis. 
Data and Definitions
“The Indigenous numerically small peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East” 
are officially defined by federal law (Federal’noe Sobranie RF, 1999) as peoples of Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
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fewer than 50,000 individuals, which settle on the ancestrally occupied lands (home-
lands), maintain traditional lifestyle and activities, and regard themselves as inde-
pendent ethnic groups.1 Given this definition, the INSPN comprises only numerically 
small Indigenous ethnic groups (Indigenous minorities). Larger peoples, such as the 
Yakut, Komi, and Buryat, are not included in the INSPN and are not surveyed in this 
paper.2 In recent years, a more careful ethnographic analysis and rising appreciation 
of Indigenous ethnicity has led to an increase in the officially recognized INSPN. 
The census of 2002 distinguished 35 INSPN  3 (Goskomstat Rossii, 2002), up from 
26 in 1989. Most recently, in April of 2006, the government adopted a revised list 
of Indigenous minorities, which now includes 40 northern ethnic groups (Table 1). 
These groups enjoy special Indigenous minority rights and privileges (which are 
modest compared to other Arctic countries). Most data available for longitudinal 
comparisons, however, include the 26 ethnic groups included in both the 1989 and 
2002 censuses (see Table 1). Further, the paper will largely refer to two different 
groupings of the INSPN: most of the following discussion deals with the INSPN-26 
(used in the 1989 census) and INSPN-35 (used in the 2002 census and in most an-
nual statistics of the late 1990s and 2000s). In the text, I will make a special note and 
distinction wherever necessary. 
It is also important to define Native “homelands.” This is methodologically 
crucial, because statistical data on the INSPN is typically operationalized through 
the notion of homelands. The list of Indigenous homelands at the rayony (county) 
level is approved by the Russian Government. Since 1980, this list has been changed 
and amended four times (1980, 1987, 1993, and 2000). In 1993, it was altered most 
significantly. Currently, the list includes all or most of the territories of Nenetskiy, 
Yamal-Nenetskiy, Khanty-Mansiskiy, Dolgan-Nenetskiy (Taimyrskiy), Evenkiiskiy, 
Chukotskiy, and Koryakskiy autonomous districts (okrugs)4 and parts of other regions 
in the European and Asiatic North. Most of these are rural areas traditionally settled 
by the INSPN, where they either dominate or constitute a substantial proportion of 
population. Throughout this paper, I refer to the Indigenous homelands in the official 
post-1993 interpretation, and provide a special note in other cases if necessary. 
Yet another problematic subject in conducting the ethnic group-based analysis is 
the definition of ethnicity. According to the methodology adopted by the 2002 census 
of Russia, the ethnicity question was open-ended and appeared on the form filled by 
100% of respondents (forms “K” and “Д”), who reported their ethnicity based on 
1.  In the text, I abbreviate this official title to INSPN (Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the 
North). Sokolovski (2006) provides a useful overview of historical change in defining indigeneity and 
in the legal recognition of the Indigenous peoples in Russia.
2.  Henceforth, I use the term “Indigenous people” to denote the INSPN only.
3.  At the time, Russia officially recognized 35 ethnic groups, but the census considered Alutour together 
with Koryak. Out of 35 peoples, however, only 28 are geographically “northern peoples,” while 7 
additional ethnic groups reside in south Siberia regions.
4.  In 2007, Evenkiiskiy and Taimyrskiy okrugs were amalgamated with Krasnoyarskiy kray, and Kory-
akskiy okrug with Kamchatskaya oblast’ (now Kamchatskiy kray).Andrey N. Petrov
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Table 1. Census Population Count of the Indigenous Peoples of the Russian 
North (1926–2002)
Censuses*
USSR (1929–1989) Russia (2002)
Totals Total** North, Siberia, 
and Far East
Year of Census 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002 2002
Northern Indigenous Peoples 132549 143359 131111 153246 158324 184448 208980 198745
Nenets 17566 24053 23007 28705 29894 34665 41302 40187
Evenk 38746 29666 24151 25149 27531 30163 35527 34610
Khant 22306 19160 19410 21138 20934 22521 28678 27655
Even 2044 9698 9121 12029 12286 17199 19071 18642
Chukchi 12332 13835 11727 13597 14000 15184 15767 14109
Nanai 5860 8526 8026 10005 10516 12023 12160 11569
Mansi 5754 6315 6449 7710 7563 8474 11432 10572
Koryak 7439 7354 6287 7487 7879 9242 8743 8271
Dolgan 650 3971 3932 4877 5053 6945 7261 6879
Nivkh 4076 3902 3717 4420 4397 4673 5162 4902
Selkup 1630 6441 3768 4282 3565 3612 4249 4056
Itelmen 4217 1706 1109 1301 1370 2481 3180 2939
Ulchi 723 n/d 2055 2448 2552 3233 2913 2718
Saami 1720 1836 1792 1884 1888 1890 1991 1769
Eskimo 1293 1309 1118 1308 1510 1719 1750 1553
Udege 1357 1743 1444 1469 1551 2011 1657 1531
Ket 1428 1243 1019 1182 1122 1113 1494 1189
Yukagir 443 507 442 615 835 1142 1509 1176
Chuvan 705 611 n/d n/d n/d 1511 1087 990
Tofalar 415 410 586 620 763 731 837 723
Nganasan 887 738 748 953 867 1278 834 811
Orochi 647 n/d 782 1089 1198 915 686 426
Negidal 683 n/d n/d 537 504 622 567 505
Aleut 353 335 421 441 546 702 540 452
Orok 162 n/d n/d n/d n/d 190 346 298
Enets n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 209 237 213
Indigenous Peoples added to the List of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the 
North, Siberia and the Far East after 1989***
Shor n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 13975 12773
Veps n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 8240 n/a
Todja n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 4442 4435
Kumanda n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 3114 2888
Soyot n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 2769 2739
Teleut n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 2650 2534
Telengit n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 2395 2368
Kamchadal n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 2293 2013
Tubalar n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 1596 1533
Chelkan n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 855 830
Chulym n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 656 643
Taz n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 276 256
Alutor n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 12 10
Kerek n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 8 3
Notes:  * data for different Censuses are not equally reliable; ** total is given for 26 ethnic groups included in 1989 and 2002 Cen-
suses (INSPN-26); *** reflects changes effective 17 April 2006; n/d, no data available. 
Sources: Rosstat, 2004b, vol. 4, 13; Bogoyavlensky, 2004; RAIPON, 2007Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
CSP 2008, 35.2: 269–290  273
their self-identification (if literally translated, the question directly asked “what is 
your nationality?”). The ethnicity of children was identified by parents. These prin-
ciples were identical to previous Soviet censuses (Goskomstat Rossii, 2002). Such 
consistency makes possible direct longitudinal comparisons. 
Answering the question about language proficiency, 100% of respondents were 
asked to indicate their ability to speak Russian and up to three other languages. It 
was a change from the 1989 census, where respondents were only requested to name 
their mother tongue (without a clear indication of the ability to speak it). In contrast, 
in 2002 Rosstat assigned mother tongues to every INSPN-35 group post factum: 
the ability of Indigenous individuals to speak their Native language was considered 
against the official list of mother tongues during the census data post-processing 
(Goskomstat Rossii, 2002:560). Also unlike preceding censuses, questions on eth-
nicity and language were separated on the form to avoid a possible conflation of the 
two by respondents. 
Unlike the rest of the country, where extended census questionnaires covered 
only 25% of residents, the 2002 census targeted 100% of individuals residing in 
the Native homelands. Therefore, the census represents a unique near-100% sample 
of the Native homelands population that includes data on household arrangements, 
demography, housing, ethnicity, language, citizenship, sources of subsistence (in-
come), employment, socioeconomic characteristics (labour force participation, sec-
tor of employment, occupation, place of work), migration and the number of life-
born children. It also gives complete information on people’s ethnicity elsewhere in 
the country.5 
In addition to the census, this paper incorporates information from the annually 
published statistical reports concerning the INSPN (Goskomstat Rossii, 1999; Ros-
stat, 2005). Unfortunately, these annual Rosstat datasets include information only 
on the INSPN living in their homelands. Moreover, due to the data collection lim-
itations, many variables are given only for the Indigenous population residing in 
rural areas. This creates some problems with reconciling annual figures with census 
results. The longitudinal comparability of yearly statistics is further undermined by 
frequent changes in definitions of both the INSPN and their homelands. However, 
the scope of these variations is limited, and does not make year-to-year comparisons 
impossible. 
Population Change and its Sources
Three major points are to be mentioned when discussing population change among 
the INSPN. First, taken in total, the Indigenous population of the Russian North 
demonstrated a steady growth over the last several decades (Table 1). In October 
5.  Certainly, many experts expressed strong reservations about the accuracy of 2002 census. There are 
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation of results, as well as of failure to collect information about 
a substantial portion of Russia’s population (see details in Heleniak, 2003).Andrey N. Petrov
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2002, the INSPN-35 reached the 243,000 population mark, including 209,000 for the 
original 26 INSPN. The latter figure can be compared to 181,500 INSPN-26 in 1989 
and 153,200 INSPN-26 in 1979. Northern Indigenous minorities, however, consti-
tuted only 0.16% of Russia’s total population. 
Second, the dynamic of the Indigenous population depended on both natural 
growth and “non-demographic” factors (Figure 1). “Non-demographic” determin-
ants included legal changes or shifts in ethnic self-identification by individuals (i.e., 
the “ethnic drift”). Historically, the assimilation factor was remarkably strong for 
almost all northern Indigenous minority groups, reducing the population growth by 
70% in 1970–1978 and 12.0% in 1979–1989. In contrast, reclaiming Indigenous 
ethnicity and other “non-demographic” factors contributed to INSPN-26 growth by 
5.5% in 1989–2002 (Bogoyavlensky, 2004). 
Finally, both demographic and assimilation-driven population changes signifi-
cantly differed from one Indigenous nation to another. According to the 2002 cen-
sus, some groups experienced big gains in population, in particular Nenets, Khant, 
Evenk, and Mansi (Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1). Other northern peoples demonstrated 
substantial losses, such as Nganasan (partly attributable to errors in the 1989 cen-
sus), Orochi, Aleut, and Ulchi (Tables 1 and 2). Population numbers of many IN-
SPN-26 remained essentially the same as they were in 1989. This differentiation 
stems from dissimilarities in the natural growth and nondemographic factors among 
these groups.6 
Annual statistics indicate that over the entire period between 1989 and 2002, 
only 2 of 26 northern Indigenous nations experienced natural decline (Bogoyav-
lensky, 2004). However, after the socioeconomic crisis fully unfolded, there were 
already 12 depopulating groups in 1995–2000 (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2004).7 The 
analysis based on detailed statistical reports available since 1996 (Goskomstat Ros-
sii, 1999, Rosstat, 2005), confirms the latter observation: 12 Indigenous groups have 
experienced natural decline between 1996 and 2004, including 9 having persistent 
natural loss throughout these years. Such depopulation is a deeply abnormal demo-
graphic event, given that the INSPN have not completed stage three of the demo-
graphic transition. 
A comparison between the census population figures and population estimates, 
based on natural growth between 1989 and 2002, showed substantial discrepancies 
that can be largely attributed to ethnic drift. Bogoyavlensky (2004) demonstrated that 
as many as 12 Indigenous ethnic groups between 1989 and 2002 grew mostly due 
to “nondemographic” sources  8 (Figure 1). Some beneficiaries of ethnic drift were 
6.  The intergroup differentiation in the post-Soviet period can be largely attributed to nondemographic 
sources (ethnic drift and legal recognition) of change (they explain 92.1% of variance). This observa-
tion highlights the impact of institutional reforms in the Russian North after 1991.
7.  However, these two analyses slightly differed in their spatial coverage: regions of the “Extreme 
North” vs. regions of “traditional settlement of Indigenous peoples” (i.e., the homelands).
8.  Unfortunately, the annual natural growth statistics for the entire period between 1989 and 2002 are 
not available. Bogoyavlenskiy used unpublished Goskomstat materials. Moreover, his analysis of Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
CSP 2008, 35.2: 269–290  275
smaller INSPN, which experienced different degrees of “revival” in recent years 
(e.g., Saami). Other ethnic groups, especially living in oil-booming areas (e.g., Khant 
and Mansi), gained population from mass re-registrations amid the windfall of bene-
fits for Indigenous peoples.9 Federal and regional laws supporting Native popula-
tions, passed in the 1990s, provided additional economic incentives for people to 
reclaim their Indigenous status. The estimated effect of nondemographic factors on 
population growth in 1989–2002 (Bogoyavlensky, 2004) was remarkable for large 
groups such as Khant (43.4%), Evenk (34.5%) and Mansi (75.3%). Other important 
components of “nondemographic” change were legislative amendments (in particu-
lar, the legal recognition of certain ethnic groups as separate entities), as well as 
confusion and past errors in data collection (e.g., Enets vs. Nenets, Orok vs. Orochi, 
Even vs. Evenk). 
Other INSPN, however, remained under strong assimilation pressure from both 
Russians and larger Indigenous groups (Figure 1). Available estimates (Bogoyav-
lensky, 2004) show that 14 Indigenous groups lost population to ethnic drift. Among 
them, 8 experienced net population loss between 1989 and 2002: Aleut, Eskimo, 
Orochi, Udege, Chuvan, Ulchi, Nganasan, and Koryak (Table 1). In all of these 
cases, the nondemographic loss overwhelmed natural growth, except for the Orochi, 
natural growth included only Native homelands, and, thus, tends to underestimate population num-
bers, especially for certain ethic groups (e.g., Nanai, Udege). Consequently, this data should be used 
and interpreted with caution.
9.  In post-Soviet Russia, people of mixed origin are granted an opportunity to freely change their “of-
ficial” ethnicity (this was not the case in the USSR, where citizens had to permanently choose their 
“passport” ethnicity once, at the age of 16). A passage of new, more liberal, legislation by regional 
governments in some instances had an effect of a sudden surge in Indigenous population, similar to 
the aftermath of Bill C-31 in Canada.
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Figure 1. Sources of change in the Indigenous Population, 1989–2002.
Source: estimates by Bogoyalvensky (2004)Andrey N. Petrov
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who experienced natural decline in addition to ethnic drift. Assimilation tendencies 
will be considered in more detail in the following section on Indigenous languages. 
Table 2. Selected indicators of the Indigenous peoples living in homelands (in the North, 
Siberia and the Far East), Census 2002
Population 
change 
1989–2002*
Births 
per 1,000 
women**
Urban, 
%
Working 
age, %
Employment 
in land-based 
economy, 
%***
Employment 
in selected 
modern  
sectors,%***
Employ-
ment 
rate, %
No sec-
ondary 
educa-
tion, %
Ability 
to speak 
Native lan-
guage, %
Aleut -16.1 1534 21.5 65.2 5.5 13.4 60.8 6.3 7.4
Chukchi 4.4 2170 16.5 59.7 19.1 5.5 59.1 11.7 45.7
Chuvan -21.5 1835 29.8 58.7 12.7 12.4 65.4 7.7 8.9
Dolgan 10.3 2038 16.9 56.5 29.4 5.2 60.9 13.7 64.1
Enets 19.7 1919 12.2 61.9 18.9 8.2 46.3 15.5 33.5
Eskimo 2.7 1993 25.7 62.0 9.0 10.9 60.5 6.5 15.4
Even 11.8 2256 31.3 58.3 12.9 6.6 52.8 10.4 32.6
Evenk 18.8 2131 22.8 58.6 11.2 7.5 49.5 10 19.7
Itelmen 30.9 1921 34.4 63.3 5.1 6.2 46.7 6.4 5.3
Ket 37.8 2304 16.7 60.1 3.8 5.2 54.2 16 30.7
Khant 28.7 2109 33.2 58.3 11.1 7.5 49.7 16.6 44.2
Koryak -2.2 1953 28.6 61.3 9.8 7.3 44.4 12.1 29.3
Mansi 38.1 1947 50.7 58.0 6.1 7.0 49.9 9.8 20.3
Nanai 2.3 2130 28.3 64.1 7.5 4.7 40.0 8.5 26.5
Negidal -3.4 2210 22.8 61.0 11.4 3.5 39.3 11.4 6.3
Nenets 20.8 2494 17.0 53.2 25.7 4.7 48.2 25.7 70.7
Nganasan -33.9 2158 18.1 56.5 18.6 3.9 42.2 13.2 50.1
Nivkh 11.5 1986 46.7 62.9 9.8 5.1 48.2 10 9.8
Orochi -22.3 1974 35.2 62.9 23.5 5.6 55.5 6.8 4.3
Saami 8.5 1813 38.4 61.6 13.9 8.4 47.9 11.9 32.1
Selkup 19.2 2152 15.9 61.9 12.2 8.8 40.9 18.5 30.7
Tofalar 15.2 1917   5.8 63.2 3.7 3.5 19.3 19.2 15.8
Udege -12.9 2298 22.0 63.2 12.3 3.6 44.2 13 9.1
Orok 93.2 1748 56.7 65.8 12.2 5.1 34.4 9.4 3.7
Ulcha -8.2 2121 15.2 61.3 8.5 11.2 37.0 14.5 13.4
Yukagir 35.7 2277 42.0 57.1 12.5 6.6 63.2 8.1 27.5
Notes: the table represents only 26 ethnic groups included in 1989 and 2002 Censuses (INSPN-26); * data for all Russia; ** cal-
culated as the ratio between the total number of births and total number of women who reported having children (multiplied by 
1,000), information for women 15 years of age and older; ***- Land-based economy includes agriculture, hunting, fishing, forestry, 
and related industries. “Modern” sectors include administration, security, finance, real estate, business, social services, transport, 
construction and communication. 
Sources: Rosstat, (2004b, vol.13), Sokolovski (2006). Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
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Geographic Distribution: In Homeland in Minority
Traditional areas of settlement (homelands) of the Indigenous peoples of the North 
are located in 25 regions of the Russian Federation (Figure 2, boundaries are given 
as of 2002). In contrast to other Arctic regions, and despite the vastness of Native 
homelands, the INSPN do not constitute a majority in any of these areas, including 
the Indigenous autonomous districts (okrugs), in which they are titular nations. Until 
January 1, 2007, there were seven such autonomous okrugs: Chukotskiy (of Chuk-
chi), Evenkiiskiy (of Evenk), Koryakskiy (of Koryak), Khanty-Mansiiskiy (of Khant 
and Mansi), Nenetskiy (of Nenets), Taimyrskiy or Dolgan-Nenetskiy (of Dolgan and 
Nenets) and Yamalo-Nenetskiy (of Nenets). The Indigenous population exceeds 25% 
only in Koryakskiy (40.3%) and Chukotskiy okrugs (30.7%). The majority of popula-
tion in northern regions is Russian, with substantial portions of Yakut, Buryat, Komi, 
and Karel in the Republics of Sakha-Yakutiya, Buryatiya, Komi, and Karelia respect-
ively. The INSPN in many areas cannot even be considered a significant minority 
(Figure 2). On the other hand, they frequently constitute majorities in rural areas, 
whereas Russians typically dominate in cities. This urban-rural majority-minority 
divide, in conditions of urban primacy and rural isolation, poses significant challen-
ges for the Indigenous peoples to assert their rights and make their voices heard.
Geographically (Figure 2), most Indigenous minorities are concentrated in the 
Republic of Sakha, Khabarovskiy kray and autonomous okrugs of West Siberia (each 
has over 10% of the total INSPN population). Note, however, that in any of these re-
gions the share of the INSPN population is only in single digits. This spatial disparity 
(high concentration vis-à-vis small population shares) causes additional assimilation 
pressures on the Indigenous minorities. The process of amalgamating autonomous 
okrugs with neighbouring populous regions, now under way in Russia, is likely to 
exacerbate these problems (Evenkiiskiy, Taimyrskiy, and Koryakskiy okrugs were 
abolished in 2007).
Fertility
Indigenous fertility in the Russian North, in the last few decades, gradually declined. 
This is a common trend for Native peoples across the Arctic (Arctic Human Develop-
ment Report [AHDR], 2004), most of whom exhibit receding crude birth and fertility 
rates. It is also generally consistent with the pattern of demographic transition. How-
ever, the fertility decline among the INSPN in the 1990s was exceptionally rapid 
and driven by socioeconomic cataclysms in the post-Soviet North (Fondahl, 1995; 
Semenov and Petrov, 2001). By the late 1990s, the crude birth-rate dropped to 17.6 
per 1,000 from 30.2 in 1984–1988 (Bogoyavlensky, 1994 and 2004, data for 26 IN-
SPN) or, according to a different account, from 31.9 in 1989 to 16.2 in 2003 (Klokov Andrey N. Petrov
CSP 2008, 35.2: 269–290   278
et al., 2004, includes 35 Indigenous peoples living in their homelands). Based on the 
annual statistics available for the Indigenous homelands only (Goskomstat Rossii, 
1999; Rosstat, 2004a), during the late 1990s and early 2000s birth rates continued to 
fall, although at a modest pace. They dropped by about 3.0 points between 1996 and 
2004, as the number of births continued to decline (Figure 3). 
In comparative terms, the birth rate of the INSPN is below the Arctic average 
of 19.7 (AHDR, 2004). However, it is much higher than in the rest of Russia (10.2 
in 2005, Rosstat, 2006). In fact, some INSPN are among the most “fertile” ethnic 
groups in the country (Table 2): Nenets, Even and Chukchi are among the top 20 in 
the number of children per woman — 2.5, 2.3, and 2.2 compared to just 1.4 for ethnic 
Russians (Rosstat, 2004b). 
Similar to other Arctic regions (e.g., Romaniuc, 2003), there is evidence of links 
between the integrity of the traditional Indigenous culture (e.g., measured by the 
Native language proliferation) and higher fertility (Table 3). To a lesser extent, high 
Indigenous fertility can be associated with conditions of “underdevelopment,” such 
as low levels of education and economic participation (particularly in “modern” in-
dustries) among Indigenous people, especially women. In fact, Indigenous northern-
ers are among the least educated Russian citizens: 41.5% lack high school education 
Figure 2. Regional Distribution and Concentration of the Indigenous Numerically Small 
Peoples of the North in 2002
Source: Rosstat, 2004b) 
Regions key (obl. – oblast’, AO – autonomous okrug): 1 - Amurskaya oblast, 2 - Arkhangel’skaya obl., 3 - Republic of Burya-
tiya, 4 - Chitinskaya obl., 5 - Chukotskiy AO, 6 - Evenkiiskiy AO, 7 - Irkutskaya obl., 8 - Kamchatskaya obl., 9 - Republic of 
Karelia, 10 - Khabarovskiy kray, 11 - Khanty-Mansiiskiy AO, 12 - Republic of Komi, 13 - Koryaksky AO, 14 - Krasnoyarskiy 
kray, 15 - Magadanskaya obl., 16 - Murmanskaya obl., 17 - Nenetskiy AO, 18 - Primorskiy kray, 19 - Republic of Sakha, 20 
– Sakhalinskaya obl., 21 - Taimyrskiy AO, 22 - Tomskaya obl., 23 - Tumenskaya obl., 24 - Yamalo-Nenetskiy AO.Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
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compared to 22.4% in the federation (Rosstat, 2004b). Indigenous people, again es-
pecially women, are also less economically active and have fewer employment op-
portunities than the non-Indigenous population. According to the census (Table 2), 
the Aboriginal employment rate is only 52.0% (Rosstat, 2004b). In addition, about 
75% of Indigenous people are rural dwellers (Table 2).
Although the underlying reasons for high fertility among the Indigenous people 
in Russia are similar to Indigenous populations elsewhere, the nature of rapidly 
declining fertility of the INSPN is rather complex and, largely, is not attributable 
to the “conventional” drivers of the demographic transition (e.g. “modernization,” 
improvements in family socioeconomic status, penetration of education, etc.), since 
none of these conditions can be observed. To the contrary, similarly to all Russia’s 
citizens, Indigenous northerners were affected by the economic crisis that unfolded 
after the collapse of the USSR (Donskoy et al., 2001). Deteriorating economic well-
being, diminishing social assistance, and a growing uncertainty in economic future 
forced families to engage coping mechanisms, including delaying or foregoing child-
birth. The crisis was particularly severe in the North, where price hikes and shortfalls 
in goods, fuel, and food supplies (due to the failures of the centralized delivery sys-
tem) were accompanied by backlogs in wage payments. The post-Soviet economic 
shock was an especially powerful factor in the early 1990s, when the Indigenous 
crude birth rate dropped from almost 40 to 26 per 1,000 over just a few years (Fig-
ure 3). However, studies demonstrated that purely economic factors did not entirely 
explain the overall fertility decline in the North (Petrov, 2006). Whereas the direct 
role of economic crisis was considerable, the decrease in fertility was also related 
to the rapid fertility transition amid deep changes in the traditional socioeconomic 
organization and existential conditions of Indigenous households. 
The traditional division of labour and family organization of tundra reindeer 
herders, although substantially altered by Soviet economic reforms and forced sed-
entarization, were still partially preserved under the kolkhoz/sovkhoz system. Most 
families were still involved in nomadic or semi-nomadic reindeer herding, in which 
traditional roles of men and women were somewhat maintained (Klokov et al., 2004). 
Institutional reforms of the 1990s resulted in the quick erosion of this system, espe-
Table 3. Relationship between fertility, Native language proficiency and se-
lected socioeconomic indicators
Total 
popula-
tion
Urban, 
%
Working 
age, %
Employment 
in land-based 
economy, %
Employment 
in selected 
modern  
sectors,%
No 
secondary 
education, 
%
Ability to 
speak  
Native lan-
guage, %
Births 
per 1,000 
women
Births per 1,000 
women .460* -.343 -.596** .266 -.525** .369 .485* 1.000
Ability to 
speak Native 
language, %
.525** -.358 -.749** .611** -.288 .624** 1.000 .485*
Notes: * significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed), ** significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed). The table represents ethnic groups and variables 
included in Table 2.Andrey N. Petrov
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cially for some ethnic groups. Indigenous families had to adjust to a deteriorating 
economic situation and diminishing state subsidies. One of the ways to adapt was to 
resettle in villages and abandon reindeer herding in favour of more profitable em-
ployment for both genders. This move triggered fertility control mechanisms such as 
parity-related family limitation. Besides, the economic utility of children diminished 
in nonnomadic settings, while the cost of raising them increased. In other cases, even 
if a complete sedentarization was not the case, there was a change in labour (and 
family) relations between genders. Men tended to continue with nomadic reindeer 
herding, whereas women (whose labour has always been underpaid in the sovkhoz 
system) became more prone to stay and find an alternative job in villages, thus ef-
fectively separating Indigenous families. Both processes, of course, had a decisively 
adverse impact on fertility among Indigenous peoples, although they may also have 
contributed to declining infant mortality.
The connection between fertility and traditional lifestyles is also evidenced by 
higher fertility rates among the INSPN who managed to expand the traditional econ-
omy. Nenets is the case in point with 20% population growth, highest among the IN-
SPN fertility, and successful family-based reindeer herding (Klokov et al., 2004). In 
addition, studies show a strong statistical relationship between traditional (nomadic) 
family reindeer husbandry, change in number of reindeers, and population dynamics 
of Indigenous ethnic groups (Khruschev and Klokov, 2001).
In sum, the rapid fertility transition among the Indigenous peoples was set off 
by a sudden economic crisis and institutional reforms, not by improving social and 
economic conditions. Changes in lifestyle and family behaviour, caused by the crisis, 
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Figure 3. Crude birth and death rates (per 1,000) among the Indigenous 
numerically-small peoples of the Russian North in 1989-2004
1 – crude birth rate for all INSPN-26 regardless of residence in 1989-2002 (an estimate by Bogoyavlenskiy, 2004); 
2 – crude birth rate for INSPN-35 living in their homelands in 1996-2004 (Gokomstat Rossii, 1999; Rosstat, 2005); 
3 – crude death rate for all INSPN-26 regardless of residence in 1989-2002 (an estimate by Bogoyavlenskiy, 2004); 
4 – crude death rate for INSPN-35 living in their homelands in 1996-2004 (Gokomstat Rossii, 1999; Rosstat, 2005).Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
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have long-term consequences. Even after the acute economic problems were par-
tially resolved in the early 2000s (i.e., the direct impact of the crisis was lifted), birth 
rates of the INSPN failed to increase (Figure 3), indicating that the fertility transition 
is likely to be irreversible. This conclusion leads to a potentially paradoxical situa-
tion in the Indigenous demographic dynamic, in which the fertility transition is not 
accompanied by a mortality transition. In other words, falling fertility coexists with 
high mortality. Thus, the Indigenous population in the Russian North has experi-
enced an unusual type of demographic transition, in which the decline in fertility 
outstrips the decline in mortality. If this distortion is not alleviated in the long term 
(i.e., mortality does not eventually decline), it may lead to a true demographic crisis 
and trigger depopulation. 
Mortality
In the past three decades, Indigenous mortality in Russia was persistently high and 
was not declining, except for short periods — most remarkably in the late 1980s 
during the “anti-alcohol” campaign (Fondahl, 1995). This trend illustrates a stalled 
mortality transition and contrasts with other northern Indigenous nations, which have 
experienced steady declines in mortality since the 1960s (AHDR, 2004, Romaniuc, 
2003). In 1989–2002 the Indigenous death rate in Russia increased by about 1.0 per 
1,000 (see also Klokov et al, 2004), although by 2004 it receded to the pre-crisis 
levels (see Figure 3). The death rate peaked in the early 1990s (over 17.0 per 1,000!). 
Although mortality among the INSPN slightly declined during the early 2000s (Fig-
ure 3), it still drastically deviated from expected levels, given the young demograph-
ic structure of these ethnic groups. For the INSPS-26 living in their homelands, the 
average death rate in 1996–2004 was 13.6 per 1,000 (Rosstat, 2005) compared to 
just 4.3 per 1,000 in Nunavut (Statistics Canada, 2006) and around 8.0 in Greenland 
(AHDR, 2004).
An increasing death rate in the middle-age cohorts is closely related to the growth 
in unnatural causes of death among the INSPN during the 1990s. Including accidents, 
poisoning, injuries, suicides, and murders, these causes of Indigenous mortality reach 
37% (as reported for the West Siberian nations, Bogoyavlensky, 2004). Ziker (2002) 
identified 60% of deaths in the Taimyr community of Ust’-Avam, between 1991 and 
1997, as violent. This is true especially for Indigenous men of working age. Although 
unnatural causes are an important factor in Indigenous mortality elsewhere across the 
Arctic due to an array of social issues (e.g. Trovato, 2000, Romaniuc, 2003), their 
impact in Russia is much higher than anywhere else in the North (cf. in Greenland, 
17.5%; in Alaska, 24.6%; in Canada, 22%) (AHDR, 2004; Health Canada, 2000). 
Alcohol addiction frequently is the underlying reason for unnatural deaths, as well as 
a strong contributor to morbidity. Annually, over 2,500 residents of the Indigenous 
homelands are diagnosed with clinical forms of alcoholism (Rosstat, 2005). It has Andrey N. Petrov
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been speculated that as much as two-thirds of all deaths in some Indigenous home-
lands can be directly or indirectly attributed to alcohol-related causes (Anisimov, 
2002). 
High mortality in the young and middle age cohorts is associated with an ex-
tremely low life expectancy of Russia’s Indigenous peoples. Even prior to the breakup 
of the USSR, Indigenous life expectancy was only about 60 years, at least 10 years 
shorter than the national average in 1989 (AHDR, 2004) and approximately 10 years 
less than the life expectancy of Native Canadians (Romaniuc, 2003). In the 1970–80s, 
by some accounts, the life expectancy of the Indigenous population in Russia (espe-
cially males) was as much as 18–20 years less than of the non-Indigenous northern 
population (Bakulin and Osipov, 1993). Thus, the life expectancy gap between the 
INSPN and the non-Native population in Russia/USSR was substantially wider than 
in other northern countries. Inadequate health care and social marginalization of In-
digenous minorities have often been cited as major factors in the life expectancy dif-
ferential. 
In the post-Soviet period, the life expectancy of the INSPN declined even fur-
ther. The socioeconomic crisis and the liberalization of hard liquor sales are strong 
contributing forces to this negative trend (Anisimov, 2002; Ziker, 2002). Some es-
timates suggest that the life expectancy of Indigenous northerners fell to 50 years 
by the mid-1990s (data for the Chukotka region, Chernukha et al., 2003; for the 
Evenkiya region, Anisimov, 2002), i.e., it returned to the 1979 level (AHDR, 2004). 
For example, in 2005 the life expectancy at birth of the predominantly Indigenous 
rural population in Chukotskiy okrug (Chukchi and Chuvan) was 50.8 years (46.9 for 
males and 55.4 for females) and in Koryakskiy okrug (mostly Koryak), 51.3 years 
(44.9 for males and 61.2 for females). The population of these two Indigenous home-
lands had the lowest life expectancy in Russia, 13 years below the nation’s average 
(63.8) for rural populations (Rosstat, 2006). 
A curious fact is that between 1989 and 2002 Indigenous infant death rates were 
in an unstable but persistent decline, while mortality in middle-age cohorts, especially 
among males, was on the rise. The drop in infant mortality from 41.1 in 1984–1988 
to 27.6 per 1,000 in 1999–2002 (Bogoyavlensky, 2004), while good news certainly, 
does not look impressive, given that infant mortality is close to 10.0 in most Arctic 
regions outside Russia (AHDR, 2004). In remote northern autonomous regions (Chu-
kotskiy, Koryakskiy and Evenkiiskiy okrugs) infant mortality rates were soaring up 
to 52.8 per 1,000 in 1997 (Goskomstat Rossii, 1999). The structure of infant death 
causes reflects a deep social crisis and the lack of childcare and medical services in 
the Russian North (Semenov and Petrov, 2001). Many areas have high rates of infant 
injuries and accidents, perinatal deaths, and respiratory diseases. 
As a result of high death rates and rapidly falling birth rates, the natural growth 
among Indigenous minorities declined from 19.7 in 1984–1988 to 5.9 per 1,000 in 
1999–2002 (Bogoyavlensky (2004) for INSPN-26) or to 6.1 for the INSPN-35, liv-
ing in nonurban areas in their homelands (Rosstat, 2005). In other worlds, Indigenous Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
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minority groups experienced a three-fold reduction of natural growth over merely 
one decade. This demographic shock was instigated by dramatic social and economic 
challenges of the post-Soviet transitional period.
Native Language Proficiency and Ethnic Drift
It may be argued that Native language proficiency reflects the true level of belonging 
to Native cultures. The penetration of the Native language among people who claim 
Indigenous identity may be a good proxy of ethnic group’s integrity and its capacity 
to withstand assimilation pressures. In this context, it is informative to analyze both 
the INSPN’s proficiency in respective Native languages and in Russian — a domin-
ant language of assimilation. 
The census of 2002 indicated that the overwhelming majority of Indigenous 
peoples in the Russian North spoke Russian. The figure varied from 88.4% for Nenets 
to 95–100% for most Aboriginal nations (Rosstat, 2004b). Typically, almost 100% of 
the urban Indigenous population could speak Russian, whereas rural residents were 
noticeably less likely to be Russian speakers, although in all cases the percentage of 
Russian speakers exceeded 80%. A strong penetration of the Russian language is, of 
course, not surprising given its dominant status in the education system, government, 
media, and other existential domains. 
On the other hand, the 2002 census revealed that Aboriginal languages were 
fading. In 1989, about 65% of the Indigenous people (INSPN-26) indicated a Native 
language as their mother tongue (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2004); by 2002, only 38.5% 
reported an ability to speak the Native language of their ethnic group (see Table 1, al-
though these data are only for Indigenous residents of the North, Siberia, and the Far 
East, and the language questions in 1989 and 2002 were formulated very differently). 
Smaller Indigenous groups demonstrated the poorest knowledge of a mother tongue. 
In 8 of them, less than 10% of population could speak their Native language in 2002 
(e.g., Orok, Aleut, Negidal, Orochi, Itelmen), while virtually all representatives of 
these ethnic groups reported to be Russian speakers. These are clearly endangered 
languages spoken only by several dozens of people (e.g. Orok – 11, Orochi – 18, 
Aleut – 33 persons). However, the linguistic and cultural disintegration is not only 
a prerogative of the small INSPN. Only 19.7% of Evenk, second largest, although 
spatially dispersed ethnic group, spoke their mother tongue. This partially is due to a 
doubled assimilation pressure from both Russians and Yakut. 
Table 3 indicates a positive and strong relationship (r = 0.61) between the level 
of engagement in a land-based economy and Native language preservation. Posi-
tive correlation with lowest levels of schooling reflects the destructive impact of the 
mainstream (Russian-based) education on Native languages. The negative relation-
ship with the percentage of people in working age probably points to the effect of 
strong assimilation of these cohorts, born and educated in the Soviet period. More Andrey N. Petrov
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populous Indigenous peoples tended to maintain higher levels of Native language 
penetration than smaller ethnic groups (r = 0.53). However, there is no clear pattern 
indicating the relationship between Indigenous language proficiency and population 
dynamics. 
Among ethnic groups with low numbers of Native speakers (below 20%), there 
are two distinct categories: those that had population loss (e.g., Evenk, Udeghe, Chu-
van, and Orochi) and those that experienced population gain (e.g., Orok, Itelmen, 
and Nivkh), both mostly due to ethnic drift. In the former case, the direction of the 
drift was towards assimilation, whereas in the latter case it was towards reclaiming 
the Indigenous identity and ethnic revival. In both cases, though, the population base 
of these ethnic groups is quite unsustainable, and the future of Indigenous cultures 
remains uncertain. 
Population Structure: Four “Lost” Generations
The current population composition of the INSPN reflects two major processes of 
the Indigenous population dynamic: the demographic crisis (falling birth rates, in-
creasing male and middle-age death rates, and low life expectancy) and the non-
demographic change (assimilation or reclamation of the Indigenous identity). The 
Indigenous population structure, to some extent, mirrors the general patterns of 
demographic change in Russia (e.g., the baby-boom and echo waves). Population 
pyramids for northern Indigenous minorities (aggregated for INSPN-26) and Rus-
sia’s total population are presented in Figure 4. Census 2002 data reveal noticeable 
dissimilarities (or anomalies) that make Indigenous nations distinct from the rest of 
the country’s population. The following points are the most notable.
First, the population pyramid of the Indigenous population registers only a weak 
effect of the postwar baby-boom (40–55 years old cohorts). This anomaly may be 
explained by very high Indigenous infant and child mortality rates in the 1950s and 
high contemporary death rates in these age cohorts. This generation, reaching their 
maturity in the 1970s, was deeply affected by assimilation, which was particularly 
strong in that period (Bogoyavlensky, 2004).
Second, there is a noticeable effect of social policies implemented in the 1980s. 
Improvements in social conditions, childcare, and economic well-being among the 
INSPN, coupled with the rapidly falling infant mortality and still soaring fertility, led 
to a strong showing of the second baby-boom wave. It is reflected in the high share 
of youth (10–19 years old). In fact, youngsters comprised 24.1% of Indigenous popu-
lations, compared to 16.0% in Russia (Figure 4). This wave in Indigenous cohorts 
would have been even more profound, had there been no assimilation. 
Third, most Indigenous ethic groups are female-dominated. Women comprise 
53.7% of the Indigenous population (vs. 53.4% in Russia). Moreover, due to a sharp 
gender mortality differential, women prevail almost in all age cohorts starting at 
age 15, despite substantially trailing boys in early childhood (952.5 girls per 1,000 Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Post-Soviet Era
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boys). A higher mortality of male children (mostly from unnatural causes, infectious 
and respiratory diseases) could be an explanation here. Note that in Russia, women 
start to dominate only in cohorts beyond 30 years old (still early compared to other 
developed countries). The INSPN clearly face a “male population crisis,” both in 
young and middle-age cohorts. For example, the sex ratio in the 40–44 cohort is 
1,311.8 women per 1,000 men. Indigenous communities lose their male population 
primarily because of devastating death rates. Indeed, the age-specific mortality of 
males between ages of 30 and 59 in Russia is three to five times as high as of females 
(Rosstat, 2004a). However, the degree of female dominance is different for different 
INSPN. The most distorted sex composition is found for Even, Negidal, and Nga-
nasan (more than 1,250 females per 1,000 males). 
One of the most revealing illustrations of demographic problems of the Russia’s 
Indigenous peoples is the notion of “lost generations” clearly depicted in the age struc-
ture. The following analysis of population composition suggests distinguishing four 
“lost generations” of Indigenous northerners: “fading elderly” (over 60), “troubled 
middle age” (40–59), “runaway youth” (20–24) and “children of the crisis” (0–10). 
Lost Generation 1: Fading Elderly 
High mortality rates among the Indigenous groups have already been discussed ear-
lier. Not surprisingly, the INSPN have a very limited number of elderly. In fact, ac-
cording to the 2002 census, people over 60 years old comprise only 6.3% of the total 
Indigenous population, whereas at the national level this age group forms 21.0% of 
the population (Rosstat, 2004b). The age of 60 is beyond the Indigenous life expect-
ancy line (see above). The Aboriginal elderly were apparently lost to severe condi-
tions of life during their early years (in the 1930–1940s), to social marginalization of 
the 1950–1970s, and to the failure of the public health system in the 1990s. The “ex-
tinction” of the elderly is an extremely worrisome phenomenon, since it undermines 
the ability of northern peoples to carry on their Indigenous culture and traditions. 
Another important difference between the INSPN and the rest of Russia is the small 
number of surviving elderly women.  
Lost Generation 2: Troubled Middle Age 
Figure 4 clearly shows that Indigenous middle working age cohorts (40–59) appear 
to be underrepresented compared to the rest of Russia. A weak working age base is 
a troubling condition for ethnic groups with high dependency ratios (1.5–2.2 times 
the national average), such as northern Indigenous minorities (Klokov et al., 2004). 
Unfortunately, the middle-age cohorts are subjected to several major negative demo-
graphic factors: high mortality, particularly from unnatural causes (stemming from 
social marginalization, alcoholism, and criminalization), and the virtual absence of 
the first baby-boom wave. Indigenous males were more affected by high mortality 
than women mostly for social reasons (Klokov et al., 2004). This age group has also Andrey N. Petrov
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experienced considerable assimilation pressures. It is not an exaggeration to conclude 
that the Indigenous peoples experience the working age and male population crises. 
Lost Generation 3: Runaway Youth 
The next weak spot of the Indigenous age pyramid is in the cohorts of 20–29 years 
old. Unlike the national population structure, these cohorts are noticeably small, es-
pecially given high birth rates at the time of their entrance (although offset by high 
infant mortality). There may be several explanations to the relative weakness of the 
Indigenous youth. One deals with assimilation, because the 1970s and early 1980s 
were decades of increasing miscegenation, acculturation, migration to large cities, 
and russification (Bogoyavlensky, 2004).10 Therefore, children of that time could 
have been registered and raised as non-Indigenous people. Many were educated in 
boarding schools away from their families. In addition, the young northerners are 
exposed to assimilation by outmigrating for education or work. Departure in a search 
for new opportunities is instigated by the deep economic marginalization and scarce 
10.  For example, in the mid-1980s only 26.2% of children born in mixed Selkup-Russian marriages in 
Tumen’ region were registered as Selkup. At the same time, 97.4% of all newly consummated Selkup 
marriages were ethnically mixed (Shargorodsky, 1994).
 (Source: Rosstat, 2004b)
Figure 4. Population structure of the Russian Federation and the Indigenous 
Peoples of the North, Census, 2002
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job prospects in Indigenous homelands. However, this loss may have been partially 
compensated by the mass reclamation of Indigenous identity in some INSPN in the 
1990s. To fully understand these trends, the “runaway generation” needs a further 
detailed study. 
Lost Generation 4: Children of the Crisis 
The most recent chapter in the history of the Indigenous peoples is associated with 
the unfolding socioeconomic crisis (Fondahl, 1995, Semenov and Petrov, 2001). Be-
tween 1989 and 2002, the natural growth in these ethnic groups was quickly fall-
ing, primarily due to declining fertility. Although birth rates of the INSPN remained 
greater than of non-Indigenous northerners and much greater than the Russian aver-
age, the dropping fertility marked potential problems in reproducing Indigenous 
populations, particularly combined with high mortality. The post-Soviet generation 
of Indigenous northerners is numerically smaller than it would have been, had the 
trend of the 1980s been preserved. The severe economic crisis and growing social 
problems, as well an accelerated demographic transition, left the Indigenous popu-
lations with fertility levels below other Native peoples across the Arctic. In addi-
tion, the hardships of the 1990s eroded the social infrastructure, medical services, 
and childcare support. For example, at the peak of the crisis, northern regions of 
Russia saw closures of 139 obstetric care centres (1993–1996), 24 child policlinics 
(1994–1996), and a 20% decrease of available spaces in pregnancy care facilities 
(Goskomstat Rossii, 2000b). 
No  doubt,  the  “children  of  the  crisis”  face  additional  challenges  to  ensure 
the survival of their ethnic groups. Although there are signs of the resurging In-
digenous identity and the recognition of Indigenous cultural and educational rights 
(Federal’noye Sobranie RF, 1999), cultural, economic, and social emancipation of 
the Indigenous minorities is still an issue. As mentioned earlier, there is evidence of 
fading Indigenous languages amid depopulation among many Indigenous peoples.
Conclusions
It is not an exaggeration to say that the 2002 census revealed a troublesome trend in 
Indigenous demographics in the Russian North. Despite the Indigenous population 
growth between 1989 and 2002, Indigenous minorities experienced a true demo-
graphic crisis with a rapid fall of fertility and high mortality. Both of these trends, 
in this form and sequence, are contrary to demographic transition theory. They are 
also at odds with demographic trends registered in other parts of the Arctic. Much 
of the negative dynamic in the Russian North is directly attributed to dramatic eco-
nomic, institutional, social, and cultural changes in the region after the collapse of Andrey N. Petrov
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the Soviet Union. Some of these changes were destructive to Native lifestyles and so-
cial well-being (and, in turn, to demographic trends), although others helped to raise 
the appreciation of Indigenous identify. Formidable social and economic challenges 
to Indigenous minorities are exacerbated by the deeply remote and isolated location 
of northern Aboriginal homelands (Figure 2). In addition, the ability of the INSPN 
to defend their rights and bargain for more privileges is undermined by their minor-
ity status in all northern regions, even where the Indigenous population is highly 
concentrated. 
The Indigenous “numerically small peoples” require particular attention from 
the federal and regional governments. They need to be fully included in social, eco-
nomic, and political processes, and to be provided with all means to continue their 
tradition and culture (Murashko, 2003). Indigenous minorities require special socio-
demographic policies, which are yet to be developed. Maintaining traditional econ-
omy and lifestyle will achieve social justice and equality for the Indigenous peoples, 
and ensure their demographic viability, thus avoiding the “loss” of future generations 
of Indigenous northerners. 
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